Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now entering its fifth year, has triggered one of the most
significant population movements in recent European history. A new policy brief from the Danish
Institute for International Studies (DIIS), published February 23, 2026, argues that the
consequences for Ukraine extend well beyond demography: the country is facing a human capital
crisis that will shape its capacity for recovery and reconstruction regardless of when or how the war
ends. The loss of population — through external displacement, internal displacement, death, and
emigration — is eroding precisely the skilled workforce, institutional knowledge, and economic
participation that reconstruction will require.
Ukraine’s population decline predates the invasion. From a peak of 52 million at independence in
1991, the population had already fallen to 42 million by 2015 following the Maidan Revolution and
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and to approximately 38 million by 2024 — driven by emigration
for economic reasons and collapsing fertility rates. The war has dramatically accelerated this
trajectory. As of February 2026, 5.9 million Ukrainians have been registered as refugees globally,
3.7 million remain internally displaced within Ukraine, and an estimated 10.8 million people are in
need of humanitarian assistance. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, approximately 4.4 million
people have returned to their places of residence — but 325,000 of those returnees are at risk of
secondary displacement due to continued energy infrastructure attacks and winter conditions,
according to IOM data published in February 2026.
The DIIS brief draws on 18 semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian refugees and diaspora
representatives in Denmark, alongside a review of recent academic and policy literature, to examine
what different war outcomes might mean for mobility patterns and reconstruction. Its central
finding challenges a core assumption in much Ukrainian government planning: that refugees will
return in large numbers once the war ends. The proportion of Ukrainians wanting to return home
has already fallen — from 83% in 2022 to 61% in 2024, according to UNHCR — and DIIS author
Ninna Nyberg Sørensen argues that even a favourable war outcome is unlikely to reverse the long-
term integration of Ukrainian refugees into European labour markets and societies. The longer
displacement continues, the more entrenched these patterns become.
Against this backdrop, the DIIS brief argues that policy should shift from a return-maximisation
logic to a flexibility-maximisation logic: rather than designing systems to incentivise or pressure
return, host countries and Ukraine itself should maintain conditions that allow people to move
between Ukraine and their host countries over time — contributing to reconstruction without
requiring permanent resettlement. This framing has direct implications for the EU’s post-temporary
protection transition currently under negotiation, which the brief implicitly critiques for its binary
structure of “return” or “national permit” with insufficient provision for ongoing transnational
mobility.
Two further human capital dimensions receive sustained attention in concurrent research. An IOM
analytical brief published in May 2026, drawing on General Population Survey data from
January–March 2026, examines veteran reintegration — a population of compounding
vulnerability: combat trauma, physical disability, disrupted civilian careers, and families under
sustained economic stress. Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy has separately projected a need for 5
million additional workers to support recovery and reconstruction, a figure that cannot be met
without either substantial return of displaced persons, large-scale immigration, or radical
improvements in labour market participation among currently underemployed groups — including
women, who constitute approximately 76% of external refugees and whose labour market
reintegration will be central to any recovery scenario.
Key Facts:
DIIS policy brief author: Ninna Nyberg Sørensen; based on desk review of academic and
policy literature and 18 semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian refugees and diaspora in
Denmark; published February 23, 2026
Ukraine’s population decline: 52 million (1991) → 42 million (2015) → ~38 million (2024)
— decline predates the war
Current displacement (February 2026): 5.9 million registered refugees globally; 3.7 million
internally displaced; 4.4 million returnees; 10.8 million in need of humanitarian assistance
Return intentions declining: 83% wanted to return in 2022 (UNHCR); fell to 61% by 2024
Secondary displacement risk: 325,000 returnees at risk of being displaced again (IOM,
February 16, 2026); over one-third considering moving abroad again
DIIS core argument: population loss is a human capital problem, not only a demographic
one; flexibility of mobility — not forced return — is key to recovery
Labour shortage: Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy projects 5 million additional workers
needed for reconstruction
Veteran reintegration: IOM analytical brief (May 2026) identifies compounding
vulnerabilities — trauma, disability, disrupted careers, family stress — as obstacles to
reintegration
Gender dimension: women ~76% of external refugees; female labour market participation
critical to reconstruction scenarios
OECD (March 2026): published “Ukraine’s Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis:
Return, Reintegrate, Reconnect” — comprehensive analysis of Ukraine’s institutional and
policy response
EU temporary protection: extended to March 2027; post-TP transition offers national
permits or assisted voluntary return — no harmonised EU-wide status
Expert Insight (SWRR Centre):
The DIIS brief’s reframing of Ukraine’s displacement crisis as a human capital problem rather than a
purely demographic one is analytically significant — and politically uncomfortable. Demographic
framing tends to generate policy responses oriented toward population recovery: incentivising
births, encouraging return, restricting emigration. Human capital framing points in a different
direction: the question is not how many people Ukraine has, but what skills, experience, and
institutional knowledge are present and where. A population of 30 million with high labour market
participation and retained professional capacity may be better positioned for reconstruction than a
population of 38 million with high unemployment, significant disability, and hollowed-out
institutional expertise.
The argument for mobility flexibility over return pressure is grounded in an empirical observation
that refugee and diaspora research consistently supports: integration into host country labour
markets tends to be cumulative and partially irreversible. After four years, Ukrainian refugees in
Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Denmark have established employment records, social
networks, language skills, and in some cases property ownership. The Ukrainian Ambassador to
Denmark’s framing — “not by force but by creating the conditions for people to go back home” —
captures a political reality that Ukrainian government planning sometimes elides: the state cannot
compel return without generating the kind of human rights violations that would undermine its
international relationships, so the only viable instrument is making Ukraine itself attractive to return
to.
The veteran reintegration question deserves attention as a distinct governance challenge.
Demobilised soldiers with combat experience, trauma histories, and disrupted civilian careers are a
known source of social and political instability in post-conflict contexts if reintegration is poorly
managed. Ukraine is not yet post-conflict, but the accumulation of veterans — and the state’s
capacity to support their return to civilian life — is already a live policy problem, not a future one.
IOM’s May 2026 data on “compounding vulnerabilities” among veterans suggests the challenge is
more complex than employment placement alone: it involves health systems, mental health
infrastructure, family support, and the legal and financial frameworks governing disability and
pension entitlements for those whose service has ended through injury or demobilisation.
Sources:
DIIS — Danish Institute for International Studies — “Forced displacement from Ukraine: The
potential role of migration in Ukraine’s future reconstruction,” Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, February
23, 2026
IOM — “325,000 Ukrainian Returnees Risk Displacement Again as Winter Energy Crisis
Deepens,” February 16, 2026
IOM — Displacement Tracking Matrix, Ukraine: General Population Survey Round 23
(January–March 2026), published May 2026
IOM — “Veterans Reintegration in Ukraine: Compounding Vulnerabilities and Access to Support
Among Veterans,” May 2026
OECD — “Ukraine’s Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis: Return, Reintegrate,
Reconnect,” March 2026
UNHCR / USA for UNHCR — Ukraine Refugee Crisis statistics, updated June 2026
IOM — Ukraine and Neighbouring Countries Crisis Response Plan 2026